

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

QI Panel:

Rehabilitating a Cratering Image: Israeli Influence in America

August 5th 2026

11:00 AM - 12:00 PM ET

Nick Cleveland-Stout 2:03

Hello and welcome to this webinar discussion hosted by the Institute, rehabilitating a cratering image: Israeli influence in America. My name is Nick Cleveland Stout. I'm a research associate in the Democratizing Foreign Policy team here at the Quincy Institute. We are a transpartisan think tank in Washington that is working to build a world where peace is the norm and war is the exception. In our research and writing, and through our advocacy efforts, we're promoting ideas that move U.S. foreign policy and national security away from military adventurism. And in our program, we focus a lot of our efforts on how U.S. foreign policy is oftentimes steered by corporate, political, and foreign interests rather than the public national interests.

And today's topic is right on brand with that. There's sort of two sides of this to unpack. On the one hand, there are the explicitly pro-Israel donors, for instance, AIPAC, which has spent \$67 million so far this year, according to a New York Times analysis this week, and has been used to primary critics of Israel, such as Thomas Massie, and will no doubt continue to be relevant ahead of these these midterms. But in the past couple of years, the Israeli government has also ramped up its more direct influence operations that are subject to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the U.S. foreign lobbying law. According to a Quincy Institute paper I authored titled "The Eighth Front Inside Israel's \$1 billion Influence Campaign, Israel is on track to become the largest spender under FARA this year, even more than its Gulf neighbors like Saudi Arabia or Qatar, countries which also spend millions and millions of dollars, but despite all of this potential influence, polling shows that Americans have largely soured in their in their views towards Israel in response to the war in Iran and Israel's military siege in Gaza, in particular, you know, AIPAC spent \$30 million in the Senate primary race in Michigan, which was just called, and still wasn't able to defeat the Democratic candidate Abdul Al-Said.

So, my so how do we square this this circle and understand the current role of pro-Israel influence in American politics today. Well, to understand how we got here and to make sense of all this, I am honored to welcome our panelists who have a wealth of expertise on this topic here today. I'm happy to introduce Eli Clifton, co-founder and senior advisor at the Quincy Institute. He is an investigative journalist and co-author, along with Ian Lustick, of the forthcoming book *Israel's Lobby: America in the Grip of a Foreign Power* which is out next week on August 11th. So please make sure to get those pre-orders in. I'm also so grateful to be joined by Dr. Dalia Scheindlin, a public opinion researcher and a political advisor who has worked on nine national campaigns in Israel and in 15 other countries. She's currently a policy fellow at the Century

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

Foundation, author of *The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel: Promise Unfulfilled* and a senior analyst and columnist at Haaretz newspaper.

So, to get us started, my first question is to you, Eli. Your new book tracks the growth over decades of what you call the most powerful foreign policy lobby in American history. So, what is the Israel lobby that you refer to? If you could help us demystify that term a little bit, and what made you want to write this book?

Eli Clifton 5:49

Thank you, Nick, and thank you for putting together this this excellent panel. Israel's lobby, as as we write about in the book, is it's a panoply of organizations, groups, and individuals-Jews, Christians, and others-who advocate for American policies that explicitly favor the interests of Israel. To be clear, it is a changing coalition of groups such as AIPAC, major individual donors, political action committees, think tanks, evangelical organizations, and officials who are aligned with Israeli government priorities. But it's also, I think really important to identify what Israel's lobby is not. It is not all Jewish Americans collectively, nor is it a single organization. It is the list that I provided, and it is changing over time. The thing that made me want to write this book now is because I think you know, and to give all credit where credit is due to Steve Walt and John Mearsheimer with their groundbreaking book, the Israel Lobby.

A lot has changed since the publication of that book. You know, it it has been now nearly 20 years, and that means that the methods through which Israel's lobby is able to exert power, as well as the costs on Americans, I believe, has fundamentally changed in that time period. Now, I'm sure we'll touch a lot upon a lot of these as we go forward with the discussion. But the role that Israel's lobby has played in funding our elections, in shaping our democracy at home, is fundamentally different than it was in the early 2000s, thanks to the Citizens United Supreme Court decision that opened the floodgates of money into our campaign finance system, but in other respects, the lobby, as as you've written about Nick, have changed in the ways that it is trying to engage with the public opinion. You know, back in you know 2007, it was very much about when we talk about Hasbara and Israel's efforts to engage in the arguments, that it was very much about rebutting and refuting the arguments of Israel's critics.

Not to say these elements weren't there at the time, but they have metastasized in the ways that Israel's lobby now tries to shut down debate. It's about stifling debate and at times, even weaponizing our our own legal system to try to criminalize speech that is critical of Israel, both through the efforts to deport green card holders who have engaged in speech critical of Israel, but also in using federal dollars to try to punish and coerce American universities where speech critical of Israel has been allowed on their campuses.

So an enormous amount has changed, and and finally, I would just say that another reason that I felt strongly about this book is that I think Americans are more aware and more concerned than they have in the past about the role of foreign influence in our democracy and in our policy making, and they are more aware than they have been in the past about the special interests

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

that are trying to shape our political discourse in our elections. And I don't believe we can have a really full conversation about that threat to our democracy and to our ability to to to align policy with American interests unless we talk about what what what we show in the book to be one of the largest special interests operating within our democracy, and that is Israel's lobby.

Nick Cleveland-Stout 9:11

Thanks so much for that, Eli. Now over to you, Dalia. I want to start by asking a similar kind of definitional question, which is about the word Hazbara. You've you've written a number of of pieces for Haretz 972 Magazine, a number of other outlets talking about Hasbara. And so, would you mind just explaining to us and our audience here? You know what exactly does that word mean? How has it evolved over time, and then you know what is unique as you've argued about Israel's approach to public diplomacy and you know explaining its own narrative as opposed to other countries.

Dahlia Scheindlin 9:55

Great, thank you for having me. Thank you for organizing this, and I also want to just plug a little. Nick's paper is really excellent on this stuff. I think it's a great compendium of information and insight about the topic. So, you know, back to your question, which is a great one because you know, what is Hezbollah is a little bit less important than what it has become for Israelis. But what it is theoretically is what many countries have, which is public diplomacy, and that can be you can expand on that as somebody who comes from the political campaign world, but not just you know electoral campaigns, but the ongoing permanent campaign. I've worked for other countries too that have a great interest in their messaging abroad. Their messaging, of course, it's at home as well. But usually, we're talking about outward-facing messaging, strategic communications, media management.

Most governments I know of at this day and age have it. Most even even specific ministries sometimes have that, and you know a lot of many you know most again most countries where I've worked and many countries where I haven't worked we know that they all have an interest in seeing their countries viewed in particular ways. But what I want to get too sidetracked, but there are many examples. So in terms of Israel, I think the difference. And by the way, the word Hazbara just derives from the the root in Hebrew for the term for the concept of explaining something, but it has become very you know brand typed to talk about public diplomacy.

And I think what distinguishes it, I was trying to think to myself what distinguishes it. I I came up with four items that I think distinguishes it. One is that let me just make my biggest point, which is what I always make when I write about Hasbara, which is I think first of all, Israelis have come to believe that their image abroad is a replacement for policies that should have changed a long time ago, and that any criticism of those policies is mostly stemming from the fact that people abroad simply don't understand them because they haven't been communicated well, and so Israel, I think, has often resorted to the idea that a better strategic communication of what it's

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

doing should take care of all those unpleasant critics, you know, criticisms that it gets from abroad.

And so, I think that if I think of what's changed, for example, from 20 years ago, is it 20 years since the book came out, since the first, since Walt-Mearsheimer? I think that at that time it was already a very robust tradition in Israeli society to just communicate our difficult policies better. But that policy has gone on for longer and longer and longer. So I'm talking particularly about the occupation as the best example, but also every escalation, every war has become more severe, greater damage to Palestinians, and so the criticism has gotten worse, and the the sense that Hasbara needs to fix it also has gotten worse. That's point one.

The other point is that, well, I guess it's related, of course, that Hasbara will, you know, improve the policy. So one, it's a replacement for policy. Relatedly, that just better Hasbara will somehow improve Israel's image, despite the fact that the policy really is the problem. I think the third item that I distinguish for Israel is that actually, you know, Israel and I, you know, I'm not embarrassed to say that I think factually I agree with some of the right wing critics here. Israel generates more attention globally than pretty much any other conflict I know about, and there are reasons for that. I disagree with the right wing about the reasons for it, but I think that you know quantitatively, Israel is constantly on the front page, and so I think from the Israeli perspective, Hasbara is absolutely essential just to keep up with the volume of coverage, which they inevitably think is negative.

Okay, so it's also a quantity factor, and that leads to what I would consider the fourth kind of unique point about how Hasbara is understood in Israel, which is that the heavy quantity of focus on Israel and Israel and Palestine, in the Israeli understanding, I mean we can call it right wing, but it's just very general and goes far beyond the right wing in Israel is that there is a global anti-Israel not only bias but practically a plot. This is almost axiomatic in Israel that the global media is always critical. It's critical of anything Israel does. That's not just not just you know a war, occupation, or or particular atrocities. Because and this is again me conjuring what Israelis and the Israeli leadership talk about, because they are fundamentally against Israel, probably anti-Semitic, and so I think that the fourth kind of distinguishing feature about how Hazbara or public diplomacy is seen in Israel is that better communication is supposed to somehow be the antidote to what they've, you know, turned into a kind of boogeyman, you know.

Not to say that there isn't critical coverage of Israel. Of course there is, but they've turned it into something that is really, you know, a kind of endemic hatred of Israel, and that only Hasbara, you know, Hasbara is the only way to try to push back at it. But I, you know, hopefully we'll have time later to get into the many forms this has taken, and I would say it would be a mistake to think about. Well, I mean, we have you know big, rich discussion about the lobby, but I would say it goes certainly beyond media messaging. Even you know whether we're talking about traditional and social or social media, it goes way beyond that, and it and it's and it goes beneath you know beneath a level only of lobbying at the political level. There's a whole middle

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

space. Which I'd be happy to try to elaborate on on how Israel has for decades tried to shape conversation at all levels of society where it can.

Nick Cleveland-Stout 15:10

Thank you for that answer. Yeah, you you had this this quote from Yossi Sareed, late Israeli politician, in one of your pieces about this that I really liked, where he was joking that Hasbara is always the refuge of of all failures. Everything is going great, you know. No need to question the policies themselves. Only the Hasbara is is garbage, and I think that quote kind of i was being sarcastic. Yes, yes, he was he was joking. Eli, I want to ask you. You have this excellent excerpt up in the Guardian in which it synthesizes a lot of these key moments in the nearly 80 years since Israel's founding, in which the Israel lobby has exerted its influence quite successfully.

Can you take us through? You know, I think people today they're very aware of of the role that that AIPAC plays today. For instance, you know, AIPAC being one of obviously many organizations that are part of this this lobby. But can you take us through a few kind of key moments throughout the the U.S. Israel relationship in which the the Israel lobby has exerted its influence successfully. You know, maybe starting with with this example that you guys detailed in in the Guardian piece specifically with with Truman?

Eli Clifton 16:30

So you know, Truman was he was sympathetic to the notion of Jewish statehood, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust. But you know, nearly his entire national security team, including Secretary of State George Marshall, who he respected very, very highly, opposed immediate recognition of the state of Israel in 1948. They were fearing war, the regional instability, the damage to American interests in the Middle East. Whereas Truman's domestic policy advisors, who had more of a mind to the political ramifications domestically explicitly argued for recognition for their argument. It was to secure the Jewish vote in the coming elections, and he ultimately followed their advice.

And as we argue in the in our piece in the Guardian, you know this established an enduring pattern of policy toward Israel, where strategic calculations of American interests abroad were sort of subjugated to or by organized political pressure at home. Some of which, as we as we get into other examples, were were really directed from Israel at American presidents either through through threat or through through actions.

And the next clear example would be you know the defeat of Ford's reassessment in 1975, where you know President Ford and Henry Kissinger they were furious at Israeli obstructions of of peace negotiations with with the Palestinians, and they formed a committee of eminent former officials who came up with unanimous recommendation to press Israel toward a comprehensive settlement to to create a Palestinian state, and AIPAC responded with a letter. It was signed by I think it was 76 senators demanding that Ford not follow that advice, that it stand firmly with Israel. Ford retreated, and the result was the Sinai II Agreement, which brought

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

enormous new aid to Israel, and this is probably the most important piece. It brought a memorandum of memorandum committing Washington and future presidents, as it showed, to coordinate much of U.S. regional diplomacy with Israel, and to avoid dealing with the PLO and oppose initiatives that Israel would have considered harmful to their interests, and as we argue in our book, this was arguably the institutional birth of the modern, you know, so-called special relationship, which went beyond sympathy for Israel or even aid to Israel.

But these were aid and diplomatic commitments that would narrow the decision making and policy options of many future presidents. Certainly, you know President Carter experienced this. He also was going to see that the ongoing festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict, much like Ford and Kissinger saw, was going to have real adverse effects for the United States and to U.S. geopolitical interests in the region, and he also came in advocating to bring an end to that. And Israel and its American supporters, the so-called Israel lobby, mobilized fiercely to oppose this effort. And and and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan actually warned Carter or threatened Carter more specifically that if the administration did not back down, Israel would appeal directly to voters to American Jews to to to to to remove their support for Carter in his re-election campaign, and Carter backed down effectively. Endorsing and I would say cementing the the the contours of that special relationship that had been formed under under Ford and with Kissinger, and what we see is you know a few other moments moving forward where you know we see a shaping of U.S. foreign policy and manners that are a little hard to explain through pure U.S. national security interests.

We have, you know, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, where while the lobby did not single-handedly cause the war, certainly, you know, very Likud-aligned American policy advisors, many of them so-called neoconservatives, pro-Israel advocates inside the George W. Bush administration, didn't hadn't just advocated for overthrowing Saddam Hussein for years. They had really talked about remaking the region in a manner that would be beneficial for Israel's strategic position.

And finally, we've talked about Citizens United already, but I think you know it would be a mistake not to talk about you know Biden, Gaza, and the 2024 election, where there was such a clear and growing delta, and I think that delta has gotten even bigger since that election between certainly public opinion in the Democratic Party and the policies that were being implemented under the Biden administration, and which Kamala Harris, when she took over the campaign, were committed to continuing if there had been a Harris administration next, and that that gap created an enormous amount of tension. And and we see in polling certainly after the election that for voters who had voted for Biden in 2020 and had not voted for Harris in 2024, the administration's unconditional in many respects, support for Israel, the provision of so much military aid, the diplomatic cover that Israel received as it pursued, you know, a policy in Gaza that many characterized as genocidal, and that certainly featured heavily the targeting of civilians, civilian infrastructure, and a host of atrocities that this administration had made very little effort to slow that down.

And the political price appeared to have been paid in that 2024 election, where we see really a Democratic Party institution as an institution and the and the Biden Harris White House as an

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

administration defying their own supporters and their own base, and depending on the polling you're looking at, they certainly paid a very high price. And there is a distinct possibility that they paid the price of losing the election in order to continue that ironclad support for Israel, even when it became politically toxic.

Dahlia Scheindlin 22:43

Could I just raise one quick response?

Nick Cleveland-Stout 22:45

Please.

Dahlia Scheindlin 22:47

Yeah, I just want to qualify a little bit the analysis of Biden in particular because I think that it contradicts. I think there's a little bit of a contradiction there because one of the main forms of leverage that you've correctly pointed out, Eli, is you know that the that that the organized pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. can say, listen, you know, if you don't kind of if you've implied that they're like a threat, and I think the only real leverage or one of the main forms of leverage is to say, listen, we will try to mobilize voters one way or the other.

And I think that the fact that the Biden administration went so far against what their voter base would have wanted, you know, probably weakens that point, which I mention mainly because I'm not really convinced that Biden's policies were the result of the of the American Israel lobby's pressure. I think that Biden himself, at least from everybody I've spoken to, who's you know who was in the administration or close to it, from what I can gather, I think we need to give Biden a little bit of the credit, so to speak, because the you know the word that I was getting is that Biden himself was deeply committed, almost unshakable when it came to his policy. So I would say, you know, I would just be cautious of uncausal explanations for some of these policies.

Eli Clifton 23:54

I absolutely agree, and I think we have to give you know ultimately these presidents do have a degree of agency in the decisions that they make. I think it is you know to contextualize the environment in which Biden was operating, as well as Trump. I should add. I think this is something that we explore quite a bit in our book. Is looking at well, what were their top donors saying, and what we very often saw was that their top donors, actually in both of their cases, certainly in the 20 in the 2024 election, were significantly somewhere to the right, for lack of a better term, of where either of them were on on Middle East policy and on Israel Palestine, and that these were the voices who these are the people who had immediate access.

These were the people who were the biggest donors to their to their campaigns, and that you know what you know whether you know there's a chicken or egg phenomenon here. I think it is

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

significant to note that certainly the people in the room when it came to the campaign were pushing, but both of these. Candidates in directions that, and again, to bring Trump in as well, that were not entirely in line with where Republican or Democratic voters were by the time that the certainly with the voters.

Dahlia Scheindlin 25:13

Yeah, certainly with the voters. Just we have so much anecdotal evidence of Biden himself, both in America from people administration, and it's the one thing Israelis all knew in Israel. It comes from his gut. That was one of the sort of things we all knew. So I think there, it's all in the mix.

Nick Cleveland-Stout 25:29

I want to jump in and remind folks. Please, if you have any questions, put them in the Q and A. The latter half of this this discussion that we've been having will be up to you guys. We'll be answering some questions from the queue. So, Dalia, I also want to be sure to ask you. We have this this upcoming election in Israel, and I want to know, you know, how some of these these issues might be playing out there. You know, Netanyahu has embraced this what he calls the eighth front, this battle for hearts and minds, to try and justify Israel's military campaign campaigns in places like like Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, and even if it's not working in the U.S. you know, winning over Americans at the polls yet.

I want to ask about kind of the the Israeli context. You know, are are Israelis convinced by by these these arguments, and you know how might a are there any indications of how, for instance, Netanyahu's main challenger, at least as of right now, Gadi Eisenkot might approach some of these questions? You know, would he maintain this this massive investment that we've been seeing this more direct investment in Hasbara operations.

Dahlia Scheindlin 26:44

Okay, so I think that for one thing, keep in mind that as much as there has been a shift and maybe you know an extra you know batch of funding going to it, it's it's been again a core part of Israeli policy for a long time. Sometimes in disarray and sometimes changing shape. So we've had in you know years past a Ministry of Hasbara or not, or a Ministry of Strategic Affairs and Public Diplomacy or not, or a National Public Directorate on Hasbara or not. So it's always there, and I, you know, there's the money going into. I would be that was one thing I thought about while looking at your paper and the data, which is you know how can we quantify the funds going in now to the you know very very widespread forms of investment that in in Hasbara over the years that are not always you know directly into the you know the the you know foreign direct Israeli government hires in the U.S. because there have been so many proxy forms of Hasbara.

So first of all, I would be careful about assuming it's such a shift if we really add all of those other forms together. And I would say that in Israel, there's-I mean, as far as I have ever, you

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

know, been involved in in this place, which is coming on 30 years since I've lived here, I have to say that it's always been a national obsession. The image among Israelis that their Hazbara is not good enough, and that it needs to be better, and that will fix everything, and that the government is failing on it, and that's one category of ideas, and the other one is that it is across the board in the Jewish population. So remember, Palestinian citizens of Israel see these issues, you know, completely 180 percent, you know, 180 degrees different.

But if we're talking about public opinion in the Jewish population, the idea that Hazbara is, you know, essential, that it is part of you know any Israel winning any image war and making Israel's policy somehow palatable, and that it's not good enough is way beyond left and right. It's almost a consensus. I would say it's you know I mean I can't cite one survey, but accumulate you know cumulative surveys when we ever test this kind of thing. I would say it's the vast majority of the right wing that believes that, probably you know upwards of 80% of the center. Again, I'm kind of putting together you know numerous findings over the years, and I would say it even cuts into the left, right? So even among the mainstream of what Israelis call the Zionist left, you would see a lot of support for the idea that Hasbara is an essential tool, and that a lot of you know Israel's poor image would go away if the Hasbro was better, and as a result, I do not see any you know declared change of vision on this, and certainly not from a mainstream politician like Gadi Eisenkot.

But I have to say that right now, it's not that it's not very central to the agenda. The specifics of it. What is more central to the agenda is is from the opposition parties, and Eisenkot is criticizing Netanyahu. That's the main thing that they have in common. And one of their main criticisms is that Netanyahu has alienated global allies, and you know the world or Israel's allies are not well. You know they're criticizing for for you know Trump. I mean you you guys probably see this differently, but they're saying that Trump, you know, doesn't really take Netanyahu's preferences into account and makes decisions without him.

And so I think there is a connection there a little bit with the perspective that Israel needs to do better internationally, but it's not very focused right now on the Hasbara issue at this moment. It could, you know, it could come up. But but I certainly wouldn't expect a change of policy, right? If if only for reasons of inertia. I mean, cutting you know if Gadi Eisenkot were to win the elections and cut back on the budget for Hasbara, he would fall under immediate criticism because it's such an across-the-board kind of understanding that it's such you know an essential part of of Israel's strategy.

Eli Clifton 30:20

Nick, if if I could, and I would love to get Dahlia's response to this as well. You know, something I know Nick has covered in to a great deal of depth, and something that I find to be particularly interesting is that you know the strategies of Israel Hasbara, the you know the arguments that are being made. You know, I think that's sort of in in one column, but there's also the methods through which it is being delivered, and one important shift, at least that that I think, and I'd love to get your thoughts on this, that appears to be occurring, is that you know previously when you

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

looked at the expenditures by registered foreign agents inside the United States under the Foreign Agent Registration Act. Who again? It's the it's the foreign it's the agent for them, not the foreign country that has to register. That Israel's or agents acting on behalf of Israel were pretty modest in the the total sums of money in the contracts and in the disclosures that were going on.

And I I think we can probably agree that probably one of the reasons that they did not have to engage in that type of influence was that they had you know the the broader Israel lobby inside the United States who could either pick up these talking points or could come up with it on their own. You had donors inside the United States. You had again AIPAC is an American organization. You might be you know pursuing policies that are in Israel's interests, but that doesn't change the fact that these are Americans engaged in this, in this, in this, in this, in this effort, and a lot of money was being spent.

To be clear, now something clearly happened in the past couple of years, which has led Israel and the Israeli government, I believe, to conclude that that was that way of doing business was no longer sufficient in achieving Israel's you know strategic objectives, certainly vis-a-vis Hasbara, because now they are investing millions and millions of dollars in registered foreign agents inside the United States, where again the Israeli government can have more direct control as well as being able to inject the money directly, and that's not something we had seen before. That is something that's typically associated with countries like Qatar, United Arab Emirates, China, Norway, and Japan used to be the big spenders in that space. And I would love to get your thoughts about well, what changed? Because certainly the the method that they are using now to inject these arguments into you know the American discourse has changed quite dramatically.

Nick Cleveland-Stout 32:48

I'll also just add I mean I I another thing that's that's that's fascinating is not only the the size of these contracts but sort of the the the methods themselves you know just to give people a taste I mean a lot of these contracts are for you know very I think kind of at the frontier of you know new types of digital influence you know training chatbots for instance is is one that I've I've written about and documented I'm you know paying influencers sponsoring delegations of influencers to to come to Israel things like that so it's it's yeah I'm also curious sort of about about your perspective about this shift from you know being able to rely on some of these these pro Israel donors based in the U.S. and organizations to a more direct involvement. Is that is that a general trend that we're seeing? Why why has that calculus now shifted?

Dahlia Scheindlin 33:41

Yeah, I mean, I'm going to go for two different explanations. Although I should really say that I I really cannot claim that I you know that I have this hard information from about this government decision. But I will say that I think there are two obvious analyzes that if I was advising the Israeli government, which I'm not, I would probably say one is that, and I've heard and I have

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

heard people in the Hasbara, you know, in the arena, say that they one of the critiques. One of the critiques when I have you know talked to people who are working directly in that in the field, is that there's a perception that Israel was not keeping up sufficiently with the new technologies, or or you know not present enough in on social media, and not really keeping up with how it has to be done now in a technical sense, and the different forms that take require different expertise, and so maybe this would be a manifestation of a decision that was intended to address that.

Because remember, you know, one of the things I was going well. Let me talk about it now. The other explanation that I would give, and I think I'm a you know I'm a little bit more skeptical of the second, but I think it might be in the mix, which is that when I said before that there were, you know, numerous types of Hasbara efforts that were not just at the level of media and not just at the level of political decision making that a lobby would take care of, we're looking at very broad social targeting.

And when I say targeting, I mean, you know, any number of organizations that were private organizations in the U.S. and in Canada as well that were just pro-Israel organizations. Right, not just AIPAC as a political, you know, as a political force, but I'm thinking particularly of things like the Israel Project, Stand with Us, you know, even things like Birthright that you know really invest in trying to, you know, train the next generation.

There were actual Hazbara training programs for young people, and these are all their media watchdogs. I include in that because not just getting the message out in the media, but you know, being kind of media well watchdog is a kind word. I think it's really media policing, to be honest. But places like camera and honest reporting here, you know, there there's a whole range of them, and many of them still exist.

And I think that you know, the Israeli government was always very closely in touch with many of these organizations. You know, the Israel Project, for example, had incredible access to the Israeli government. It was in everybody's interest for them to get their messaging, you know, aligned and develop very, very sophisticated message testing, you know, through survey research together with the Israeli government, and then try to convey that to, you know, their communities and other parts of the world. The Israel project closed down. Okay, that's that was kind of a major turning point.

That I think you know I don't know how much of that how much that really had an impact on the Israeli government, but it would be impossible for it not to have had an impact. It was really seen as a critical force from the moment it started, and I remember when it started in the early you know in the middle years of the Second Intifada in the early 2000s, and it was you know a big deal for at least a decade you know for more than a decade I guess until the original founder left, and then continued to be even more so in a way after that due to the leader that came later.

So I think that with things like that changing, you know you have to wonder if there is a understanding or a perception in the Israeli government that some of the you know genuine divisions over Israel's policy, even among its allies, right? Looking at where the Democratic

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

Party is going, and even looking at some of the you know real skepticism about Israel right now, or negative you know outright negative attitudes among some of the core constituencies in the U.S. are going to lead to changes even among stalwart supporters.

I mean, you know, the the Democrat, sorry, the Democratic Party, Israel knows, and Israel and Netanyahu in particular portrays it as a completely lost cause. But even within the Republican Party, you know, we're seeing the splits. You know, the sort of outburst of anti-Israel sentiment from some of the main MAGA influencers, even some figures within the administration, you're seeing very deep divisions. In addition to what I said before, with something like the Israel project closing down, not to give it you know too much attention, but it is possibly symbolic of a perception in the Israeli government that you maybe can't depend on those constituencies or those you know former very robust civil society groups that were really acting out of their own passion, you know.

Again, I don't want to overstate that case. I think it's probably the less likely, but I wouldn't be surprised if it's in the mix because these changes are underway. And once the government would kind of focus on this in a strategic way, I imagine they would be following that. I mean, just you know, looking at public opinion, you can almost imagine where things are going, even within you know, the Republican Party, even within Republican supporters and evangelicals, you know, the age gap alone could very well be a reason why the Israeli government would say, you know, we can't just depend on our organic network of spontaneously pro-Israel communities that have formed these very elaborate, you know, organizations to to work on the social outreach that we've been depending on.

Nick Cleveland-Stout 38:21

All right, we've got a question. Thank you so much for that answer. We've got a question now from Anne Moisen about, and I've also I'm going to tack on a question of my own to this. She so she so she asks, could the speakers comment on the impact of changing U.S. attitudes toward Israel in the midterm in 2028 elections? I want to tack on sort of the. I think there's like a short-term question to this, and then a long-term question to this. I think that you know we've established that the the public you know public opinion towards Israel has soured enormously you know since in the last few years, right? I mean, there are more Americans that sympathize with with Palestinians than Israelis. That's the first time that that's ever happened in the history of Gallup polls. But there there is also I think this this question of of of long term being able to shore up support.

So I want to I want to ask both of you guys this this question. You know, Eli. You know, you you mentioned in the intro of your book, this this pretty amazing moment in the early 2000s, in which Netanyahu was caught on a hot mic, in which he said, "I know what America is. America is a thing that you can move very easily, move it in the right direction. And you know, so APAC has become an increasingly toxic brand to a lot of people, and and a lot of the Israeli Hezbollah efforts have also generated quite a bit of backlash of their own. I mean, Dahlia, you've you've argued that that Hezbollah cannot be a substitute for for policy, but but are there other points in

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

which it seems Americans have soured on on Israel before, and they've been able. To shore up that support, how do you see this this playing out? I mean, can the Israel lobby and the Israeli government invest more into these types of operations to ensure that the relationship is maintained, or are they throwing dollars down the drain with this obsession with the idea of Hasbara, or maybe even worse, actually being counterproductive. I included a quote in my report from Professor Stephen Walt, who authored alongside John Mearsheimer 20 years ago the Israel lobby, in which he suggested that that a lot of these these operations will actually be not just ineffective but counterproductive. So, so how do you think about those questions? Whoever wants to go first.

Eli Clifton 40:46

Well, well, why don't I take the the election element of the question, and then then you can take the the Hasbara element of it. I think we have a growing this moment that we're at right now, again in the certainly in the 2026 elections, 2028, a little early for me to start speculating, but I think what we're seeing right now is record sums of money pouring into what had so far just been the primaries of this of this election cycle. You know, pro Israel groups have raised over \$160 million. I've been tracking it. I have a website, IsraelisLobby.com, that automates that process of tracking the money. And you know that's 160 million dollars. Again, 133 of that has already been spent. So they spent most of that money already. Now that doesn't mean they're going to stop spending money or raising money as we go into the general election.

They will probably be doing even more so, and I've started to wonder: Are they going to raise and spend a quarter of a billion dollars? I think it's entirely possible that again, a small number of pro-Israel super PACs may do so. That doesn't even take into account the individual donors like the Adelsons, who give enormous amounts of money into our elections. So I think that that's one element of how they have. When you looking back on Netanyahu's comments about the United States, is a very easy thing to move. Well, yes, you could do that through Hasbar. You also can do that through trying to elect leaders who who will be more sympathetic to Israel's cause. And I think you know, as we just saw in the election in Michigan last night, where AIPAC spent enormous sums of money to try to boost Haley Stevens over Abdul Sayed, and as of about an hour ago, it looks like they were unsuccessful in doing so. So this is a tactic that you know sometimes works, sometimes doesn't. B

ut I think one thing that it's worth noting is it is requiring increasing sums of money to bridge that gap between where public opinion is in both parties and where where policy is. And I don't think we have yet seen a meaningful change in policy. While we have seen politicians get elected and be and and find success in critiquing Israel, we have not yet seen meaningful changes in U.S. policy that would somehow condition U.S. aid or reduce U.S. aid, or in some manner use the leverage that the United States has over Israel to change Israel's behavior.

Now, one other element I think we should look at, and I think it's really important to recognize that while the numbers we are now seeing are truly staggering, I think that the this pattern

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

began quite earlier of politicians identifying that there really were increasingly negative sentiments about Israel inside the United States and the role of Israel in in shaping U.S. policy.

And I know that's sort of a strange example to use, but I think actually Donald Trump in 2015 and in 2016 is a really interesting politician and candidate to look at because when he was running in the primaries, he was the only candidate up on the stage, I believe, other than Rand Paul at the time, who was willing to say that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake. He said that the United States needed to have a more balanced relationship between the Israelis and the Palestinians and be a more neutral arbiter in in in the in in peace negotiations, and for the Iran nuclear deal, he was the only person on the stage who was who was not committing to tearing it up. His main critique of it was that he was offended that Iran was signing more contracts with Airbus than with Boeing.

Now, as we detail in our book, you know there really is this period of time, and it's not that big between when he clinched the nomination and and when they had and and when he needed to raise really a billion dollars to to stage a general election campaign and in that time span you see him meeting with the Adelsons and the Adelsons are very explicit that they didn't like where he was on on U.S. Israel policy and you see him make a pretty much a 180 in that process, and you know, and and he was very outspoken about the fact that the things he did, certainly in his first term as well as in his second, that were beneficial to Israel, he did partially due to the influence of the Adelsons, and certainly in his first term, you know, he he moved the embassy to Jerusalem. He sold the old ambassador's house in Tel Aviv to the Adelsons to make sure it would be hard to move the embassy back. He left the Iran nuclear agreement. He recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and all of these were things that certainly the Adelsons had expressed their enthusiasm for, and would pretty much go against the candidate who he was in the primaries.

And in the primaries, it really was quite noticeable because what he proved, even though he went and contradicted all of that once he was in the general election and was the nominee, is he proved that within the Republican Party there were a significant number of voters who certainly weren't opposed to these positions that he was taking and may have actually been enthusiastic about it, and that what was taken to be a requirement for a Republican candidate to be, you know, in lockstep with with Israel, as it turns out, certainly was not a requirement to win the nomination. It may have been a requirement in order to raise the money required to win the general election.

Dahlia Scheindlin 46:01

There's so much to pick up on here, but I want to try to you know answer the other question as well. But let me just say again, I do think Trump, you know, he had been such a such a vigorous critic of the of the JCPOA when it was happening that I think we have to also you know take anything that he said later with a grain of salt because it was quite consistent. Now again, no, there's no question that Netanyahu himself had a very strong influence on Trump. I mean, we have to. I'm always kind of careful again about uni, you know, single-minded explanations,

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

because I don't think anybody controls. Certainly not this president. But if Netanyahu, you know, really was the one of the main factors, then it's really not even about Hazbara or the lobby. It's Netanyahu himself, and we've seen that over the course of his policies during the war. I mean, that actually both things are true in the sense that you know, however much we want to factor in the lobby, every time Netanyahu meets with Trump, something seems to shift in Trump's policies.

We all have said for years that Trump is influenced by the last person he heard because he's that you know unstable on some level, and especially you know they have they have a long standing relationship. And on the other hand, we also know that when Trump wants to pressure Netanyahu to do something that Netanyahu is not inclined to do, that he sometimes does so. Now, in the long term, I agree with the critics who say that everything that looks like pressure on Netanyahu or that looks like coercing Netanyahu into something he didn't want to do, often turns out to be a bit of a you know bit of a red herring because, for example, the Gaza ceasefire, which we saw as Trump forcing Netanyahu's hands, isn't a ceasefire in the end. Having said that, it's still something Netanyahu didn't want to do.

So I think that there is more leeway for any you know for any American president to be able to take positions that are more in line with the voters, and the polling is so clear on this. Again, certainly in the Democratic parties, we're seeing it in the primary right now. I don't need to repeat the answer, but even you know the younger generation of Republicans, I do think that there, you know, there we have a likely more. It's more likely now than at any other time that I think American policy will be changing over the next few years. I think you know quickly if it's a Democratic victory, and less you know maybe more slowly when it's Republican. But it's hard to see American policy you know doing continuing along the lines of anything that looks like you know certainly Biden and parts of what Trump is doing now.

Just to get to the question about you know can Israel revive its image, you know. Can this kind of Hasbara work? I mean, my fundamental answer is not without policy change. You know, I work on political campaigns for a living, or at least I did for the last, you know, roughly 25 years. I try never to do it again. But you know, what I've learned over the years is that you really can't fundamentally convince people of things that are not totally true. Something that I've had to really rethink in the era of populism, I have to say, but I was trained in the school of thought that you can't convince people of complete, you know, falsehoods, lies. You know, you can't cover up, you know, major truths about society, and or you or you can't reverse attitudes that are very, very, you know, firmly reflective of what people themselves see and experience. A

And so, if that is generally the way things are, I really don't see how you're going to revive Israel's image by all of the fancy, you know, bot farms or whatever else is out there. Having said that, I think we should also qualify that Israel could, you know, kind of comply with everything the global, you know, that that the critics say. Israel could, you know, if Israel were to end the occupation tomorrow, Palestinian state, you know, totally independent by agreement, something shocking. I don't think those attitudes would be reversed overnight either.

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

And I think we also need to be honest that there are some people who would never change their attitude. You know, in anything that's this controversial, you're going to have a minimum number of people who simply don't like Israel for what it is. I think that's the reality. But I do think that you know, so it's I. That's where I think that there's a limitation anyway. But I think that when policy changes, I'd like to say when, maybe some of this you know can be mitigated. The problem is that I think that even if there is a policy change, it's not going to be like I said just now. It's not going to be some overnight you know end of the war in Gaza. End of occupation, completely free Palestinian state. If that will ever happen, it will take a long time.

To my chagrin, I think these things can no longer possibly depend on slow, conditional, phased kinds of, you know, agreements that have never worked in the past. But the reality is that I'm not controlling things, and that's probably what will happen. So as a result, even if there's a beginning of a policy change, which is very unlikely. Certainly not under Netanyahu if he wins again, and even under the opposition, it won't be anything like what the critics are looking for. And so I I think that it's really going to be very limited in terms of how much attitudes can be reversed.

What I think is also a likely possibility is that if there's an opposition government in Israel, and it takes some visible, headline-worthy steps, which are also good in themselves. Like, for example, the you know the low-hanging fruit would be cracking down on the most extreme and and again highly visible forms of settler violence or you know Jewish terror in the in the West Bank. I think that what we could see there is a sense among the world, what does that mean, really? Western policymakers and Western public, right?

And frankly, Gulf states who will say, "Well, you see, there's some sort of change going on here, and maybe that will take it off the radar for some people, and maybe some of the active, you know, hostility or you know demonstrations or just a major presence in public consciousness will drift away for a while because it's convenient for some of these policymakers not to think about this stuff if they can point to something and say, "Oh, you know, there's a slow change beginning, but that is, I think, certainly not going to help Israel's image in the long term because it will inevitably lead to another major, you know, escalation that will then bring all the same kind of criticism back to Israel, and I don't think it will solve anything.

You know, so I think that is a dangerous situation, both for the actual policy on the ground. Certainly for the Palestinians, it's a very dangerous situation. And if Israel is really concerned about its image, you know, I wish they wouldn't fool themselves that just you know mopping up some of the bad elements within the most you know radical violent settlers is going to change that in the long term.

Eli Clifton 52:02

think that's that. That's an excellent point. It's something that certainly gets picked up a lot in the media. Here is you know this fixation with well you know the settler violence and the situation in the West Bank, which is horrible. It deserves attention. But I do think you know if we're really

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

talking about what have been the events that have shaped these shifts in public opinion inside the United States, and I believe globally as well, it's Gaza. You know, it's it's 100,000 civilian deaths that, and many of that being you know delivered to people over social media and over forms of media that we're choosing not to cover the extent of the conflict

And I think that is something that is very hard for Israel and its advocates to undo, because you know whatever sort of labels one wants to put on what Israel did in Gaza, it offends the conscience of a lot of people, and particularly I think younger people who might not have been instilled in you know the so-called you know Hasbara that you know at times was more successful in you know portraying Israel as being this liberal democracy in the region and and I think that on the right and the left it's really noticeable to see that I think Gaza was a turning point for a lot of people either changing their perspectives on Israel or their first awareness of Israel and its its actions, as well as its influence over policymakers inside the United States, or not even influence, but the willingness of American policymakers to go along with something that again was offending the conscience of a lot of people across the political spectrum.

Dahlia Scheindlin

Yeah, yeah. No, I mean I completely agree that Gaza is the main focus, which, by the way, you know, is a big mistake because if there had been more focus and different policies from the U.S. before this, we may not have gotten to this situation. But with relation to Gaza, listen, there have been other countries who committed the most horrible, horrible atrocities you know that the world has known. Germany, World War II, Rwanda in my lifetime, Serbia, and those countries. You know either they are simply off the public radar, like Serbia. Most people don't think about it very often, or Rwanda, which not only is off the public radar, but also has rather successfully revived its image, and not justifiably entirely, because you know you have basically an authoritarian society there, which has you know terrible human rights record on political liberties.

But these things can happen, and you know for this is the global reality. Think these things can happen if the policy stops, if the war in Gaza really is over one day, and if there is some sort of political resolution, it's not that people may love Israel, but they may say, "Well, that particular thing is over. And the last second point I want to make is that there we should also consider like like examples where it has worked, so to speak. And you know, somebody I spoke to who I was quoting in a piece that I wrote back in October, Peter Lerner. Was a long-time IDF spokesperson, and he, you know, went on. He was on record in that article. Said, "Well, we had some successes, and what were the successes? He pointed to that the world did acknowledge, you know, the human. You know, he may say we managed to humanize the hostages, the Israeli hostages.

And I thought it's very telling, you know, because what it says is that you can have these kinds of successes when you put your mind to Hasbara, when it's a just cause, the hostages were a just cause. They should have been released. They shouldn't have been taken to begin with. It was a massive human rights violation, a war crime. And so, sure, when your cause is the right

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

cause, you can have people on their side, on your side, even while global attitudes were so negative towards Israel. That's one thing.

And the other thing is, I think we should give some credit to reverse Hazbara of the Israeli left. Now, I don't think anybody calls it reverse Hasbara. I just made that up right now, but I will say that the fact that we had people like I think Ro Kkanaa's visit here was a great example of this. That it's become more and more normal for you know public figures in the U.S. you know influential figures to come and visit, and not just through the you know the AIPAC you know, Hasbara type tours, and not just be given the message that the Israeli government finds comfortable, but there are so many opportunities now, and so much activism of Israelis and Palestinians to show them, you know, the full reality of what occupation really means long before this. That I think that's one of the reasons why we've had a crop, you know, generation of influential Americans making this case back at home.

Eli Clifton 56:23

I think that's incredibly important point, particularly about about as you put it, the reverse Hazbara. Which, if you just coined it right now, excellent. We should all use it.

Dahlia Scheindlin 56:32

We shouldn't say it though, because the word Hazbara has been so tainted.

Eli Clifton 56:37

I do think that the argument, which I know has been used for many many years about that Israel. You know that there are people who tend to focus on Israel, but not you know X or Y other conflict. I think that argument is increasingly finding very little success, certainly in the American political discourse, and I think it is because it is perceived as being a bit of whataboutism because the other conflicts that often people point to are not ones actually well, none of them have received the sustained level of support from U.S. taxpayers and the U.S. government, and that's where it's well.

I mean, we can talk universally about atrocities. You know, Attila the Hun was pretty bad, but or pointing to the Holocaust, but the point is, is that in this case there is a growing sense of responsibility and frustration with the role the United States is playing in this. This is not happening simply on the other side of the world, 6000 miles away. Indeed, that is where it's happening. It and and by no means am I would I want to suggest that a drawdown of U.S. support would necessarily change Israel's behavior. I think that's also, you know, a dangerous argument to get into, because Israel, just like the United States, is sovereign country. It can make its own decisions. But it's the culpability argument, and I think that's something that, for a growing number of people, is is a very potent argument and one that I haven't seen Israel really counter.

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

Dahlia Scheindlin 58:00

No, I have to answer that because, first of all, I'd be happy to debate that point. But that wasn't the point I was making. My point was when you asked if Israel can be successful in rehabilitating its image, we have these cases where countries have managed to either rehabilitate or simply take themselves off the agenda. But I would be, I would, I do have lots to say about that other issue, and maybe another time we'll talk about it.

Nick Cleveland-Stout 58:19

Another time would be great. So I want to jump in also and ask. You know, we have a few questions in the chat here. How does Israel's lobby and messaging differ from other countries, especially in the Middle East? Like this is kind of the flip side of the argument that we've been talking about, right? Like this is something that Netanyahu, you know, frequently talks about and says that there are other foreign actors that are attempting to, you know engaging in their own foreign influence operations to try and demonize Israel, and I am curious what you make of that argument in particular as it relates to to to Israel. I mean, is there any validity to that? But then also, you know, how does what we've been talking about today, Israel's influence operations, the Israel lobby. How does that differ from the forms of influence that other countries are engaging in? This might be our last question here.

Dahlia Scheindlin 59:09

I mean, I'll just start, but very quickly, I don't, I don't have a lot to say, but just that, of course, other countries engage in this kind of thing, and I think that the best example is Qatar. Right? Qatar has embedded itself very significantly with funding in all sorts of civil society institutions, from university research centers to Washington think tanks, and so whether that is you know just sort of there to create an anti-Israel sentiment, I don't really think so. I think Qatar mainly wants influence in American life. I want I think that it wants to get a whole range of messages across, including what a great negotiating country it is, for example. But it's certainly there. Again, like this is why, on some level, I completely take the point about America's you know overwhelming support for Israel for so many decades that it does have a special place. But in terms of some of these techniques, yes, they are typical forms of statecraft. But what makes them unique is Israel's unique position in American life.

Eli Clifton 59:57

I completely agree. I think. The only thing I would add is that is that perhaps Israel is moving more in the direction of where you know Qatar is in terms of the ways that it's trying to engage with Americans and influence Americans to do so through again registered foreign agents. But historically, Israel has you know as as Dahlia just pointed out had sort of a privileged place in American in American life and in a more tangible way, I would point to the fact that Israel is the only country that has you know through through AIPAC now and through the UDP their super PAC you know an ability to engage directly in our campaign finance economy and again they do

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

so through American donors to be very clear, but these American donors, when you hear what they have to say, is you know their their motivating interest in engaging in American politics is to you know advance Israel's interests in in our in our in our policy making, and that that is something that I don't think any other country can claim to. I mean, the Cuban lobby to some degree in Florida, but that in terms of the resources being brought to bear, that's an area of influence that I don't think one can find a clear parallel to.

Nick Cleveland-Stout 1:01:09

Right, last last question here. Then we've got time for just one one quick one. But I'm curious your take on this. We've got a question from Sarah Downing here. She asks, "What is the status of the proposed bill to merge Israeli defense tech in the U.S. and I wanted to kind of add on a bit of a question here, which is that you know, is this do you view this move, which is a proposal within the annual defense bill, as a kind of a recognition of where the the public polls are that they can no longer rely on the 3 billion a year from the U.S. to Israel, and so this is sort of a you know is is this the the next best option? This this integration that we're we're talking about, and then also you know intelligence sharing things like that. Are there going to be changes within the U.S.-Israel relationship, as a result of accepting this new reality?

Dahlia Scheindlin 1:02:08

I mean, I think that on a more general level, I do think we'll be seeing change, and it won't be an immediate, overnight, massive change. It'll come in these kinds of increments. I think the other big thing people are looking at is, you know, the memorandum of understanding that you mentioned the 3.8 billion a year, which is coming up for renewal, and you know even in Israel there's a debate over this. Netanyahu himself said, "Well, we should become more self-sufficient. Something I didn't expect to hear from him, probably a recognition that you know the policy we've seen up until now will be slowly and incrementally changing.

At the very least, at the very minimum, I think if there's a Democratic victory, we will see efforts to apply American U.S. law, better Leahy law, you know, restrictions on foreign aid export. That at the at the minimum, I think that's something the Democratic Party can not get away with not doing if it's ever in power. If it's in power, because that has become kind of the common denominator between I think most of the you know Democrat slash far left critics anywhere in that spectrum that seems to be the common denominator.

Eli Clifton 1:03:10

I think I think you hit all the high point, all the important points on it. The only thing I would add is that I think that they the the things that were introduced in that bill are which I believe is now this. I don't think the Senate has yet taken it up. I believe is elements that have been under discussion in Israel and from Israel's supporters in the United States for quite a long time, and that this is you know when you talk about you know the Israel at one level wanting to publicly talk and Netanyahu talking about wanting to zero out aid. This is sort of the strategy that has

Uncorrected Transcript: Check against Video for Quotes

been discussed: is a tighter integration. It's no longer about you know strict transactional you know or transfers of U.S. technology or aid. This is about tightly integrating you know especially new high tech weapon systems in ways that are not easy to untangle going down the road, and I think that's a very smart strategic decision because that would tie the hands in many ways of the United States. For you know, I'm sure Israel would hope for a generation to come. That probably is overstating it in reality, but the point is, is it would make it very costly and difficult to disentangle the military relationship, even as at a political level it becomes more and more difficult to maintain the status quo.

Nick Cleveland-Stout 1:04:30

Awesome. Well, thank you so much to our panelists today, Eli Clifton and Dahlia Scheindlin. This has been an excellent discussion. I've learned so so much from it, and thank you to all of you who are participating today. You can also subscribe to the Quincy mailing list from our homepage quincyinst.org. So you'll receive invitations to all of our events and be able to follow our work. Thank you again for participating today and for joining in our efforts to promote ideas that move U.S. foreign policy away from endless war toward military risk. Reign and diplomacy in the pursuit of international peace. Have a great rest of your day.